1. Introduction

It was in Chile, a country that had maintained close relations with the major Western powers since the Pax Britannica, that the most well-known laboratory of neoliberalism in the region was established.1 Under the guidance of economists trained at the University of Chicago, the Chilean experience of the 1970s and 1980s left an important mark on Milton Friedman’s reputation—even though Friedman himself cannot be considered a supporter of Pinochet, nor as the most relevant influence during the formative period of the “Chicago Boys.”2 In any case, Friedman was not the only internationally renowned economist to have had some degree of proximity to the Pinochet dictatorship—F. A. Hayek’s support for Pinochet has been the subject of discussion in the History of Economic Thought literature (e.g., Caldwell and Montes 2014; Farrant et al. 2012; Farrant and McPhail 2014; Nell 2014).

Although less well known, the relationship that Rosenstein-Rodan, one of the pioneers of development economics, maintained with the Pinochet government is also relevant not only for contributing to a better understanding of the complexity and intrinsic contradictions of (organic) intellectuals, but also for shedding light on the ways in which a development economist could engage with, and at times lend legitimacy to, the most radical liberal experiment undertaken by a Latin American country in the postwar period.

Paul Narcyz Rosenstein-Rodan (1902–1985) was an economist of Jewish-Polish origin.3 Born in Kraków, while still young he migrated to Vienna in search of better educational opportunities. There, he developed an interest in pure economic theory, such as marginal utility and the role of time, as well as in monetary theory, capital theory, and the socialist economic calculation debate.

Throughout the late 1920s and the early 1930s, the lack of professional prospects and the growing antisemitism eventually led him to migrate to London, after a period in Italy. He was soon hired as a lecturer at University College London. After some time, he began to collaborate with Chatham House, a think tank that, among other responsibilities, advised the British government on its strategies to confront the Nazi threat.

His best-known work dates from his period in London: “Problems of industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe” (1943). This article can be regarded as a pioneer in development economics. In it, Rosenstein-Rodan proposed massive, coordinated investments, supported by state planning, with the aim of generating the “big push” necessary to establish a self-sustaining cycle of growth in backward economies.

The 1943 article was the first work produced by Rosenstein-Rodan on the theme of economic development. One of the pioneers in advocating international aid to underdeveloped countries, it represented a watershed, both for the discipline and for his own career. From then on, the ideas of the big push and balanced growth would be at the core of the debate on economic development, and his work as an economics researcher would be directed toward international aid projects in poor countries.

The second half of the twentieth century proved a fertile period for the field of development economics. At the height of the theoretical hegemony of Keynesianism, the three decades that followed the Second World War witnessed the emergence of several strategies of economic development, especially addressed to the peripheral countries. Not by chance, most of these propositions rested on heterodox foundations, assigning the state a central role in overcoming the condition of backwardness.

Several authors produced models that stood out at the time. Although under different circumstances and on the basis of different theoretical frameworks, economists such as Roy Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar (1946), Ragnar Nurkse (1953), Arthur Lewis (1955), Gunnar Myrdal (1957), Albert Hirschman (1958), Walt Rostow (1960), and Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) proposed measures aimed at fostering development through capital formation—or, in the terms employed by Gerschenkron (1962), at accelerating the eruptive character of industrialization in backward countries. What these proposals had in common was the relevant role assigned to the state in making capital formation in the industrial sector viable.

Myrdal (1957) had already called attention to the disequilibrium intrinsic to the phenomenon of development. Regions that already enjoyed higher productivity tended to grow faster than the backward ones, which in turn reinforced regional inequalities. This is the synthesis of his concept of circular cumulative causation, a phenomenon that, in the absence of intervention measures, tended to perpetuate the poverty of underdeveloped nations.

In line with this understanding, Hirschman advocated a “strategy of unbalanced growth,” a direct criticism of Nurkse’s balanced-growth models. In his view, poor countries did not possess the financial and human resources needed to undertake simultaneous investments in several sectors of the economy, so that it fell to the state to select key sectors which, through backward and forward linkages, would tend to stimulate the industrial demand of adjacent sectors.

The most influential model of development in Latin America, however, was the structuralism of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Influenced by these European authors, economists such as the Argentine Raúl Prebisch and the Brazilian Celso Furtado proposed a model of import-substituting industrialization that was, to some extent, responsible for transforming the Brazilian economy into one of the largest industrial bases of the Western world. On the basis of a dual model, ECLA economists held that it was not possible for the peripheral countries to sustain balanced growth, given the inevitable deterioration of the terms of trade. In view of the tendency of the prices of manufactured goods to rise and of those of primary products to fall, the strangulation of the balance of payments would impose insurmountable obstacles on primary-exporting economies. The only structural solution to overcome this condition was to promote an import-substituting industrialization, in which the state would act to make the growth of domestic industry viable so as to change—rather than compress—the function of imports.

Although by different routes, with different justifications, and to different degrees, these authors corroborated the central elements of Rosenstein-Rodan’s thought regarding the centrality of investment in the industrial sector.

At the end of the Second World War, Rosenstein-Rodan moved to the United States to work on international financing projects at the World Bank. In the 1950s, he was hired by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to take up a position at the Center for International Studies (CENIS). Originally created to oppose the advance of socialism, the center sought to broaden its scope and study ways of promoting industrialization and development in peripheral countries. It was from this point onward that Latin America became a special focus of his research.

After working at the University of Texas from 1968 to 1972, Rosenstein-Rodan assumed the leadership of the Center for Latin American Development Studies (CLADS) at Boston University, a center he had founded. He clearly had ambitious projects in the areas of economic development and international aid. But, even though he could still count on a large and cohesive group of researchers at CLADS, the man who had set the agenda for a school of thought only a few years earlier, no longer enjoyed the same prestige as before. Over the years, his work was increasingly focused on reports with limited circulation which constrained the appraisal of his ideas by his peers and restricted the impact of his writings during his most intellectually mature phase.

Indeed, while during the 1950s the popularity of his work elevated his name into the select group of leading development economists, the subsequent decades witnessed the onset of the field’s decline. This waning influence stemmed mainly from disputes over its theoretical foundations and growing disillusionment with the outcomes of numerous development projects worldwide.

After the infamous military coup that overthrew President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, the new military government, led by General Augusto Pinochet, initiated a set of neoliberal economic reforms that shaped Chile’s socioeconomic reality for the decades that followed. With left-wing parties dissolved and the Constitution suspended, what followed was a period of violent repression of political and trade union movements, as well as torture and executions (Alacevich 2021).

In the following year, in his position as director of CLADS, Rosenstein-Rodan argued that Allende’s downfall was due to his incompetence in promoting growth and macroeconomic stability in the country. In this context, he said, the intervention of the military forces had been a path found to restore the foundational values of Chilean society; in his view, “[t]he people almost wished for a military coup” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 13).

Rosenstein-Rodan’s association with a dictatorial regime is, at first glance, surprising. The rather unassertive reaction to the human rights violations perpetrated in South America seems, as Alacevich (2021) points out, to be in direct conflict with his own personal history. His formative years in interwar Vienna were full of experiences that were more than sufficient to instill in him a deep understanding of the dangers of authoritarianism. Thus, despite his reservations regarding the Allende government, the new regime’s acts of censorship, persecution, and torture should probably have weighed even more heavily.

The present paper contributes to a better understanding of the ideas Rosenstein-Rodan expressed about Pinochet’s Chile. Through the analysis and comparison of texts published shortly before and shortly after the 1973 coup, it aims to clarify the author’s assessment of the situation in the South American country immediately before and after the military coup that overthrew Allende. In doing so, we aim to contribute to the literature on Rosenstein-Rodan, particularly to the seminal work by Alacevich (2021), which addresses the author’s texts, but does not offer a more detailed analysis of them. Moreover, we will show that, at least in the texts we have identified, the evidence suggests a more ambivalent and situational stance rather than unconditional support to the Chilean dictatorship; as will be shown, he refers to its convenience, but his attention was far more devoted to criticizing the Allende administration than to the actions of the dictatorship itself—and he even expresses concern about human rights violations.

After this introduction, the following section provides a brief overview of the Chilean situation at the time of the coup and some results of Pinochet’s economic policy. Next, Sections 3 and 4 synthesize what Rosenstein-Rodan said about the Chilean situation before and after the coup. Section 5 provides an interpretation of the arguments put forward by Rosenstein-Rodan in the texts under study. The concluding remarks close the article.

2. Overview of the Chilean Situation Before and After the 1973 coup

Endowed with substantial copper reserves and an extensive coastline, Chile in the 1970s exhibited pronounced social stratification and entrenched oligarchic structures (Lopes and Chehab 2015). Politically, however, the country was widely regarded as one of the most advanced in Latin America (Velasco 1976). Its democratic and republican institutions were recognized for their long-standing stability (Caldwell and Montes 2014). For this reason, the rise of a socialist or Marxist politician likely did not give the population cause to fear for the country’s future.

Known as the “Chilean road to socialism,” the economic policy of President Allende, who took office on November 4, 1970, was largely based on projects of agrarian reform and the nationalization of industrial sectors. The plan, led by the economist Pedro Vuskovic, prioritized the nationalization of key sectors of the economy, such as copper mining. In addition, the plan proposed curbing inflation by freezing commodity prices while ensuring workers’ purchasing power through wage increases (Rojas 1976).

Far from a smooth transition, however, Velasco (1976) emphasizes that the process of nationalizing Chilean industry violated certain property rights. According to the author, workers occasionally provoked disturbances in their workplaces so that, once production was interrupted, the government could intervene without requiring congressional approval, as provided for in the Constitution. An example of this was the nationalization of the textile industries in 1971. Following the occupation of the buildings by workers, the Allende government found itself encouraged to take over the firms on the grounds that an inadequate supply of textiles was harmful to the population. Thus, eight of the sector’s largest firms were incorporated into the government’s “social area.”

In parallel, Allende was paving the way for the nationalization of the financial sector. The plan’s primary goal was to establish a new credit policy, featuring lower interest rates, aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as other areas of the economy that were generally neglected. Once again, to circumvent congressional approval, the government resorted to unorthodox measures, including stricter oversight routines, the withdrawal of public deposits, and the prohibition of more profitable operations, such as those in the foreign exchange market (Velasco 1976). Considering that most institutions had their shares traded on the stock exchange, purchasing them with newly printed money was a relatively simple process. As a result, by the end of 1973, about 85% of the financial sector belonged to the Chilean state (Larraín and Meller 1991).

Even more complex was the nationalization of the copper extraction industry, a sector that accounted for more than 75% of the country’s exports. The government’s refusal to provide adequate compensation to the multinationals expelled from the country put it in conflict with the governments of the countries from which they originated (Larraín and Meller 1991). Through the structural reforms, the state gained control over the means of production—and their associated surpluses—as it deemed appropriate. However, it required only a small contingent of highly skilled professionals leaving the country for the government to be left without the technical capacity to promote expansion or even exploit the resource efficiently (Romeo 1971).

The agrarian reform process also began to face severe obstacles. Although such policies already existed under previous administrations, what occurred under the Allende government was an intensification through the deliberate relaxation of their regulatory constraints (Larraín and Meller 1991). From that point onward, criteria such as productivity and occupancy were no longer central to expropriation. Judicial recourse and compensation for those expropriated were made difficult to the point of being rendered unfeasible in most cases (Velasco 1976). The main costly consequence was a systemic decline in productivity within the primary sector.

In 1973, the economic situation deteriorated more rapidly. The most visible—and politically sensitive—aspect was accelerating inflation—from 35% in 1970 to 606% in 1973 (Caldwell and Montes 2014; Larraín and Meller 1991). This phenomenon was quickly attributed (by the opposition) to unchecked monetary issuance intended to cover the deficits resulting from the nationalization of entire economic sectors. From an external standpoint, conditions likewise worsened. The deterioration in the terms of trade observed in 1973 resulted in a pronounced decline in the country’s international reserves. Moreover, foreign investment (both direct and portfolio) dwindled as the market became aware of the country’s political instability (Caldwell and Montes 2014).

In March 1973, former president Eduardo Frei gave an interview to the London newspaper The Times sharply criticizing the government for its violations of Chilean law and institutions. Members of the Supreme Court joined the critics by warning that the country was experiencing a crisis of the rule of law. Finally, increasingly significant sectors of an ever more polarized society were mobilized in strikes and violent confrontations. In August, the Chamber of Deputies issued a document accusing the government of serious violations of the Constitution and urging it to reconsider its actions—an act that was interpreted by some as a petition for a military coup (Caldwell and Montes 2014). The outbreak of a successful truck drivers’ strike, accompanied by protests and violence, made civil war a plausible scenario.

Until the onset of the crisis, Chile appeared to be one of the Latin American countries least susceptible to the authoritarian trend emerging in the region. The capital, Santiago, had even become a refuge for numerous intellectuals and opponents of dictatorial regimes from other countries. Despite its tradition of respect for institutions, the process of intense polarization and the increasing opposition to the Allende government fostered, within segments of the population, a sentiment favorable to military intervention. Support for such intervention was not confined to right-wing parties and sectors. Sectors within the Catholic Church and centrist parties also supported the notion that a military action might be necessary to overthrow communism in the country and subsequently restore order (Paley 2001).

Soon after the coup, General Augusto Pinochet, one of the leaders of the military rebellion, consolidated his position as the dominant figure within the military junta. Under his command, the country experienced, in its first months, a series of social conflicts, violent protests, and widespread family traumas. The newly established Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) centralized much of the kidnapping, torture, and assassination of opponents of the new government. Orlando Letelier, former Chilean ambassador to the United States, was assassinated on US soil in 1976 with a bomb placed in his car, in a case that had far-reaching international repercussions (Caldwell and Montes 2014). Neither military officers opposed to the coup nor members of the artistic community were safe. Examples include Air Force Brigadier General Alberto Bachelet4 (d. 1974) and the singer Víctor Jara (d. 1973), both of whom were arrested, tortured, and killed (Paley 2001).

From an economic standpoint, the new government’s initial priorities were to achieve price stability and to restore the market economy. To this end, measures were implemented, including currency devaluation, the removal of price controls, and the restitution of several firms confiscated by the previous regime (Caldwell and Montes 2014; Paley 2001).

Government measures began to take effect from 1975 onward, when inflation fell to 22%, substantially lower than the 600% and 369% recorded in the preceding two years. Nevertheless, the decline in copper prices, the rise in oil prices, and difficulties in accessing international credit lines posed significant challenges for Jorge Cauas, the first Minister of the Economy under the military government. His “National Recovery Plan,” an orthodox shock program, paved the way for the reforms later implemented under the administration of his successor, the Chicago Boy Sergio de Castro (Caldwell and Montes 2014). If three years of poor economic management were deemed sufficient to justify the overthrow of the Allende government, the same criterion certainly did not apply to the military regime—which, until 1976, produced macroeconomic results inferior to those it had promised (Nell 2014).

The real economic recovery began only in 1977. At the beginning of that year, Castro withdrew Chile from the Andean Pact (a trade arrangement with other South American countries) and standardized customs tariffs at 10%. The aim was to promote the competitiveness of domestic industry and to eliminate the protectionism that had characterized the Allende government, whose tariffs ranged from 105% on essential goods to 750% on those considered nonessential (Caldwell and Montes 2014).

Over the period from 1975 to 1981, average annual growth was above 7%. The climate of optimism forming in the country was further reinforced by the promulgation of a new Constitution in 1980, which included a plebiscite in 1988 to restore democratic institutions. New legislation aimed at modernizing labor regulations, social security, and the health service, as well as reforming the education, justice, and administrative systems, was implemented (Caldwell and Montes 2014).

In light of such profound transformations carried out in such a short period, the perspective of qualified observers—whether national or foreign—becomes even more relevant. Without the benefit of historical hindsight, several intellectuals were willing to analyze the events in Chile pari passu during the turbulent 1970s, and Rosenstein-Rodan was among them.

3. Rosenstein-Rodan’s views on Chile on the eve of the coup

On November 29, 1972—less than a year, therefore, before the coup d’état—Rosenstein-Rodan (1973a) delivered a lecture at Boston University entitled “Chile under Allende.” Perhaps due to the format of the presentation, and the document through which we have access to his remarks—a discussion paper dated May 1973, seemingly little more than a transcription of his spoken words—the author does not provide precise sources for the information and interpretations he presents.

The author opens his presentation by noting that Allende’s election in 1970 had worldwide repercussions, but that, unlike the situation within Chile itself, there was no sense of panic in the United States, at least at first glance.5 According to him, the election of a Marxist president in Chile indicated a steady shift to the left, which did not necessarily imply a preference for revolutionary over reformist methods, either in Chile or in Latin America as a whole.

Rosenstein-Rodan contends that a proper understanding of recent events in Chile requires a historical assessment, which leads him to offer a brief retrospective of Chilean history. According to him, Chile was the wealthiest country in Latin America in the mid-nineteenth century, being surpassed by Argentina only in the late 1880s. At that time, the Chilean ruling elite was composed primarily of landowners, supported by the Church, and was progressively challenged by a more liberal oligarchic faction drawn from the middle class and characterized by its anti-clericalism. The alternation in power between these two groups did not hinder the construction of an adequate civil service over the decades, nor did it undermine the country’s adherence to the rule of law. As a result, at the time Rosenstein-Rodan delivered those remarks, Chile was regarded by him as the most politically advanced country in Latin America, as well as one of the wealthiest in the region.

In his view, for most of the twentieth century, Chile exhibited a combination of center-left political rhetoric and a more conservative political structure, such that, in his words, “the liturgical language and the heart was on the left, but the reality and a not badly packed wallet was on the right” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 3). From 1920 onward, however, there was a continuous movement toward greater diversification of the social structure, accompanied by increased political participation, a leftward radicalization, and growing political polarization. At this point, the author draws a comparison with French politics: in his view, Chilean politics resembled that of the Third and Fourth French Republics, with the notable difference that Chile lacked figures capable of playing roles comparable to those of Charles de Gaulle or Jean Monnet.

According to the author, this movement accelerated with the rise of Eduardo Frei to the presidency in 1964 (to whom Rosenstein-Rodan would later serve as an advisor). Allende’s election in 1970, Rosenstein-Rodan explains, thus represented the culmination of a process that had begun as early as the 1920s, with workers’ organizations finally bringing their values and ideologies into positions of power.

He nevertheless adds the caveat that Allende’s victory was achieved by a narrow margin and was ultimately confirmed by Congress, as stipulated by the Constitution in cases where no candidate obtained more than half of the votes. Allende had received just over 36% of the vote, in what amounted to a near tie with the runner-up, Jorge Alessandri. In light of this, Rosenstein-Rodan poses a provocative question: “Does a 1.3% plurality represent the will of the people? If it were so, the Constitution would not provide for the nomination of the President by the Congress and the Senate. After all, almost 64% of the people voted against Allende” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 5). In this sense, then, Allende’s victory fell far short of indicating the predominance of a leftist or Marxist worldview within Chilean society, according to the author’s interpretation.

It is worth noting that Rosenstein-Rodan’s friendships with influential political figures such as former presidents Carlos Lleras Restrepo (Colombia, 1966–1970) and Eduardo Frei (Chile, 1964–1970) made him an important interlocutor for the United States Embassy in Santiago, especially in 1970, the year of the election of Allende. According to documents published by the U.S. Department of State, the then-U.S. Ambassador Edward Korry acknowledged that it would not have been possible to prevent Allende from taking office following his victory in the direct election (“Allende could not be prevented from taking power,” U.S. Department of State 2014, doc. 76), held on September 4 of that year. Even so, Korry actively sought to delegitimize the socialist politician, requesting Rosenstein-Rodan’s intervention with Frei and Lleras on at least four occasions.6

In any case, Rosenstein-Rodan states in his 1972 lecture that 60% of the Chilean population was shocked and paralyzed by Allende’s rise to power, and that it took a year for half of that group to begin opposing the new regime in an organized and systematic manner. In the meantime, he reports, the middle and upper classes adopted a spendthrift lifestyle, increasing consumption—particularly of luxury goods—and operating with a short-term perspective. The army, however, was apolitical (1973a, 8), so that no solution to these dissatisfactions could be expected from it.

As noted above, Rosenstein-Rodan’s lecture took place in late 1972, that is, roughly two years after Allende assumed office. When analyzing the new president’s economic policy, however, the author adds the caveat that he will focus primarily on the first year of the administration. In doing so, he does not spare criticism. He notes that the start of the new president’s term was marked by bank runs, capital flight, and the mass emigration of skilled personnel. After the initial shock, however, the situation stabilized with the first encouraging results of economic policy, which Rosenstein-Rodan characterizes as Keynesian in the short run (pursuing income redistribution, full employment, and price stabilization) and as a transition toward socialism in the long run.

According to the author, the objectives pursued by what he classifies as Keynesian policy were the same as those of Eduardo Frei, with whom he had previously collaborated, but implemented on a much larger scale and with recourse to price controls. In his interpretation, the encouraging early results of Allende’s economic policy were made possible by prevailing conditions of high unemployment and substantial idle capacity. Moreover, maintaining an appreciated exchange rate would allow any attempts to restore profit rates to be offset through increased imports. However, in Rosenstein-Rodan’s assessment, the architects of Allende’s economic policy made the serious mistake of overestimating the validity of their own diagnosis. This led to very high rates of monetary expansion—on the order of 10% per month—combined with price freezes (which allowed price adjustments of only 20% after six months).

The result was a significant redistribution of income (wage increases for the lowest-paid workers were on the order of 50%, according to him), accompanied by a rise in aggregate demand which translated into a substantial increase in employment and output. However, industrial idle capacity, although high on average, was unevenly distributed. This, combined with the increased demand for raw materials, led to a rapid rise in imports, depleting the international reserves inherited from the Frei government as well as the stocks accumulated during the recession of the previous years. Moreover, the ambitious agrarian reform proposed would inevitably lead to a reduction in agricultural productivity which, given the low degree of idle capacity in that sector, would further exacerbate the external-sector situation.

Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1973a) assessment is that the policy of accelerated income redistribution, without a corresponding effort to stimulate increases in productive capacity, rapidly exhausted the possibilities of sustaining a growth cycle. This was because income redistribution led to a decline in profits and savings, the decapitalization of firms, and a reduction in investment. These effects were further exacerbated by the political decision to hold down prices and tariffs charged by public enterprises, including those that had recently been nationalized. In this scenario, according to the author, it was only a matter of time before even the gains derived from income redistribution would be lost. In other words, there was a growing scarcity of consumer goods, while at the same time there were no savings to finance the necessary increase in investment. The surplus had been reduced, workers’ discipline had not improved, and production was declining.

At this point, Rosenstein-Rodan seeks to dissociate what he then interpreted as the imminent failure of Allende’s economic management from the idea that this failure was intrinsically linked to a flaw in Marxist socialism. In his interpretation, the Chilean government focused exclusively on consumption and redistribution, rather than on the underlying conditions of production. For this reason, he argues that Allende’s government could be more accurately characterized as populist. He then cites a phrase he attributes to Fidel Castro regarding Allende’s Chile: “This is not a true socialist revolution. It should be a revolution of production—this is a revolution of consumption” (1973a, 12). Moreover, he maintains that inefficiency, such as that observed in Chile, was not an inherent feature of socialism, as the Soviet case demonstrated.

In Rosenstein-Rodan’s view, this failure of Allende’s economic policy could be attributed to the political difficulties arising from opposition to a change in course after the first year in office, when the president might have introduced a form of New Economic Policy, as Lenin did following the initial stage of the Russian Revolution. Despite this opposition, the author continues to emphasize the incompetence of the economists working for Allende. Such incapacity, he argues, stemmed from the lack of care with which the economic program had been drafted, evident in the incompatibility between the goals pursued and the means employed—possibly reflecting, in his view, the party’s own skepticism about the possibility of Allende’s victory.

The outcome of these errors in economic policy—the victory in what he calls “the battle of consumption,” but defeat in the “battle of production”—paradoxically led Allende, by late 1972, to achieve his goal of advancing the transition to socialism and nationalizing large portions of private enterprise. Public investment rose from 68% of the total under Frei to 85% under Allende.

For Rosenstein-Rodan (1973a), the question at the time was whether Allende’s government could change course in the face of growing shortages and the inevitable rationing that would ensue. The answer, in his view, depended on the balance of forces within the political group comprising the Unidad Popular, the coalition of left-wing parties that provided political support for the president. In his assessment, this coalition was a mosaic of groups, ranging from the more radical to more moderate, which had coalesced around the figure of Allende—an experienced politician from an elite family, who would not lead the country into civil war. The army, in turn, was apolitical, according to Rosenstein-Rodan, which made the outbreak of a civil war highly unlikely. Paradoxically, however, he notes that a convergence was already emerging, as three generals joined the president’s cabinet.

In his view, the most likely outcome would be the maintenance of civil liberties and socialist politics over the remaining four years of Allende’s administration, which, in his assessment, would be marked by economic difficulties and a decline in per capita income “almost like Uruguay” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 18). Interestingly, Uruguay’s civil–military dictatorship would begin in late June 1973, roughly halfway between Rosenstein-Rodan’s remarks and the coup that overthrew Allende in Chile.

For the author, the deterioration of Chile’s situation could eventually pave the way for a government of national salvation in a more distant future; that is, Chile would still have to see its economic situation worsen considerably before a more radical action of that kind could emerge. In the meantime, one could expect increasing radicalization and polarization, features historically uncharacteristic of Chile’s political tradition.

The text concludes with Rosenstein-Rodan highlighting the freedoms still enjoyed in Chile at the time, which, he argued, were likely to persist into the future—though not guaranteed under a socialist system, thereby posing a significant challenge to this form of social organization.7

4. Rosenstein-Rodan’s views on Chile after the coup

Four statements by Rosenstein-Rodan regarding Chile were identified from the months immediately following the coup that overthrew Allende.

The first is the transcript of a lecture delivered on October 9, 1973, at CLADS (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b). The second was a brief address before a subcommittee of the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) in Washington, DC, at a meeting held on January 30 and February 5, 1974.8 The transcript of Rosenstein-Rodan’s participation was published in a volume edited by Vicuña (Rosenstein-Rodan 1975).

The third presentation of Rosenstein-Rodan’s thinking on Chile in the immediate aftermath of the coup was an article published in Challenge, in the May–June 1974 issue (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a). The publication notes that the article is partly a summary of two lectures the author had delivered at CLADS, although it does not specify the exact dates on which they took place. An analysis of the text reveals that large portions closely mirror the lecture discussed in the previous section, which was delivered prior to the coup. Given that the late-1973 text indicates that it was also a lecture delivered at Boston University (which hosted CLADS), it is reasonable to assume that both were among the lectures referred to in the Challenge article.

Finally, on June 16, 1974, Rosenstein-Rodan (1974b) published an article in the New York Times. This text once again notes that it is, in part, a summary of two lectures delivered at CLADS and published in Challenge.

This section synthesizes the arguments put forward by Rosenstein-Rodan in each of these texts, in chronological order, with particular attention to any new points introduced in each of them.

4.1. The CLADS lecture

Rosenstein-Rodan presented his analysis in a lecture delivered at CLADS, at Boston University, on October 9, 1973, focusing on the Chilean experience under the Allende government and the immediate political and economic consequences of its downfall. The text of this lecture was subsequently published as a CLADS discussion paper in November 1973 (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b).

The author begins his presentation by framing Allende’s death as a triple tragedy: a personal loss, a symbolic blow for socialism, and an event that could be mistakenly interpreted as evidence of an incompatibility between socialism and democracy. Rosenstein-Rodan rejects this latter interpretation, arguing that Allende’s downfall was not due to socialism, but to his economic incompetence. According to him, in the contemporary context it was no longer possible to govern without at least a minimal command of economics, and the policy adopted by the Chilean government was doomed to collapse.9

In this regard, Rosenstein-Rodan reiterates his characterization of Allende’s economic policy as fundamentally populist rather than properly socialist. He revisits the distinction he attributes to Fidel Castro, according to which socialism should entail a revolution in production, whereas in Chile what took place was a revolution of consumption. The rapid expansion of the money supply, income redistribution without a productive foundation, and the absence of clear guidelines for managing socialized enterprises are said to have led to declining productivity, the depletion of foreign exchange reserves and inventories, and accelerating inflation.

The author further emphasizes that, unlike other socialist countries, which maintained high rates of investment, Chile under Allende allocated the majority of its resources toward consumption. He argues that, had the government pursued a policy of consolidation after one or two years—similar to Lenin’s New Economic Policy—the eventual collapse might have been avoided. Such a shift, however, faced resistance within Allende’s own party, and the president proved unwilling to confront its more radicalized wings.10

Rosenstein-Rodan acknowledges that Allende was elected democratically,11 but argues that he did not govern democratically, violating the spirit—and in some cases the very letter—of the law. He maintains that a simple vote count did not adequately reflect the intensity of political preferences: while a minority of the population supported the government with revolutionary fervor, the majority did so only weakly or out of rejection of the available alternatives.12 The combination of economic crisis, inflation, and government intervention—including illegal expropriations—reenergized the opposition, particularly within the middle class, and paved the way for the coup, which the author views as virtually inevitable, though not characteristic of typical Latin American coups.

In this context, Rosenstein-Rodan identifies the emergence of a kind of counter-revolutionary euphoria during the third year of Allende’s government, driven by economic deterioration and the radicalization of the political conflict. He then compares the behavior of political actors to that of passionate individuals—unable to learn from others’ experiences and prone to repeating the same mistakes—an observation he applies not only to Allende but also, preemptively, to the generals of the military junta.13

In addressing the period immediately following the coup, Rosenstein-Rodan expresses concern about the developments under the new regime, warning of the potential risks associated with continued repression and the systematic use of brutality. There were signs that the coup had unleashed forces that the junta itself might not be able to control.

At this point, Rosenstein-Rodan distinguishes between the restoration of order—which could be achieved within a year or two—and the pursuit of an ideological crusade aimed at “eradicating Marxism,” arguing that the latter would likely be counterproductive and deepen divisions within Chilean society. While he acknowledges the temporary necessity of restricting political activity during a period of abnormal transition, he insists that such measures could not become permanent arrangements without jeopardizing the prospects for a return to institutional normality and political coexistence. He also warns of the risk of human rights abuses.

Finally, the author addresses the need for institutional reforms, revisiting a proposal previously advocated by Eduardo Frei for constitutional changes that would include the synchronization of electoral calendars and the strengthening of the Executive, in a model positioned between the French Fourth and Fifth Republics. He warns, however, that such reforms should be pursued through legitimate means, such as the convening of a constituent assembly, rather than imposed by commissions appointed by the junta. Comparing the political inspiration of the Chilean military more to De Gaulle than to Mussolini or Franco, Rosenstein-Rodan states that the banning of parties representing a significant portion of the population would likely fail, given Chile’s deeply rooted political culture. Overcoming the division into “two nations,” he argues, would require subtler methods rooted in persuasion and respect for pluralism, since, ultimately, a good society is one in which the elites govern through persuasion rather than coercion.

4.2. The CIAP address

The comparison between Discussion on Chile: Diagnosis and Prognosis, presented by Rosenstein-Rodan at Boston University in October 1973 (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b), and the Statement delivered before the CIAP in early 1974, published as a short chapter in 1975 in the volume edited by Francisco Orrego Vicuña (Rosenstein-Rodan 1975), reveals both significant continuities and shifts in focus and scope. In both texts, the author maintains his characterization of Allende’s economic policy as essentially populist, aimed at expanding consumption without a corresponding transformation of production conditions. Criticisms of rapid monetary expansion, income redistribution detached from productivity gains, and declining investment reappear, as does the assessment that agrarian reform would likely reduce, rather than increase, agricultural output. The description of Chile’s relatively favorable structural conditions—high per capita income by Latin American standards, a population considered homogeneous, a functional education system, and abundant natural resources—also endures. As in earlier statements, he argues that Chilean politics up to 1970 resembled that of the Third and Fourth French Republics, with the exception that there was no figure to play the roles of De Gaulle and Monnet; by 1974, however, he maintains that a Monnet had already emerged.14

Despite this continuity in diagnosis, the text published in 1975 introduces a substantial body of information and arguments that were absent from the late 1973 lecture. Rosenstein-Rodan explicitly frames the post-coup period as a stage of national reconstruction, arguing that Chile had emerged from an “economic war” and would henceforth face technical, organizational, and psychological bottlenecks.

This new stage is presented in a clearly forward-looking manner, with timelines and quantitative estimates, which were absent in the earlier text. For example, the author notes the sharp decline in real wages—close to 50% relative to 1970 levels—and projects a gradual recovery of per capita income and wages, assuming the program is properly implemented. He also introduces data on high workforce absenteeism in 1973 and suggests that productivity gains, particularly through improved management, could play a central role in expanding output and generating surpluses for investment. This point, moreover, is reiterated several times, as if the author seeks to emphasize that the problem lay not only in the scarcity of resources, but also in their utilization.

Another significant shift in the 1975 text concerns the central role attributed to external financing. Rosenstein-Rodan estimates that approximately US$1.3 billion would be required to implement the reconstruction program and provides a detailed account of its potential sources. He mentions resources from the Paris Club, the International Monetary Fund, short- and medium-term credits contracted on the market, as well as programmatic loans targeted at specific sectors such as agriculture, housing, public works, and the provision of industrial inputs. In addition, private investment, food aid, and the possibility of a Venezuelan loan intended to mitigate the effects of the oil shock are considered. This institutional and quantitative detailing of international support does not appear in the 1973 text, nor does it include any explicit advocacy for a coordinated external financing effort of this magnitude.

Conversely, several key elements of the 1973 analysis are absent from the text published in 1975. The discussion of democracy, political legitimacy, and the intensity of electoral preferences—which occupied a prominent place in the Boston lecture—is not revisited in the Statement. Also absent are reflections on middle-class behavior, the process of political radicalization during Allende’s government, and the characterization of the coup as virtually inevitable, albeit distinct from other Latin American experiences. Perhaps most significant is the absence in the later text of the concerns expressed in 1973 regarding human rights violations, political repression, and the risks associated with an ideological crusade against Marxism. Similarly, the discussion of constitutional reforms and the institutional limits of the political reorganization carried out by the Junta does not reappear.

Thus, it can be said that, while the 1973 text focuses on diagnosing the Allende experience and links economic critique with broader reflections on democracy and institutions, the address before the CIAP shifts most of the attention to economic reconstruction, the technical feasibility of the new program, and the need for large-scale international support—an emphasis that is understandable considering the audience, which was connected to assistance for developing countries. This may explain the author’s shift toward a more restrained tone in this text, employing less irony and sarcasm when criticizing Allende compared to the other four texts analyzed.

In fact, this text functions almost like a financial feasibility plan aimed at an international audience, translating the complexity of Chile’s social crisis into terms of “resource gaps” and “financing needs.” This shift toward financial pragmatism may help explain the absence of discussion on human rights and democratic legitimacy, which were central in the author’s other works: here, the overriding priority moves from the political nature of the regime to its solvency and integration into the international financial system, although he concludes by stressing that Chile required a movement toward national reconciliation and the overcoming of the deep divisions that had marked the preceding period, perhaps implicitly—given the audience— alluding to the need to avoid a witch hunt.15

4.3. The article in Challenge

In “Why Allende Failed,” published in Challenge in 1974, Rosenstein-Rodan (1974a) revisits arguments previously presented particularly in his 1972 and 1973 lectures at Boston University. The text reconstructs the functioning of Chilean economic policy between 1970 and 1973, emphasizing the combination of rapidly expanding consumption, highly redistributive wage policies, intensive use of idle productive capacity, and rapid growth of the money supply—a combination that, according to the author, initially generated a climate of social and political euphoria but quickly resulted in inventory depletion, deterioration of the balance of payments, and accelerating inflation. This process undermined economic coordination and, ultimately, the government’s ability to govern.

Rosenstein-Rodan describes in some detail the mechanisms through which this process deepened over time, highlighting capital flight and the departure of skilled personnel, growing uncertainty among the middle class, the banking run, and the state’s growing difficulties in administering nationalized enterprises, reflected in weak managerial capacity, persistent operating deficits covered by monetary expansion, and the absence of effective financial discipline.

While he reiterates that state ownership was not, in itself, the central problem, the author argues that these factors decisively contributed to the decline in productivity and the reduction of investment, a point that reappears, with minor variations, in his analysis of agrarian reform, which he portrays as frequently arbitrary and illegal, with adverse effects on agricultural output and supply. Also playing a significant role, according to the author, were the strengthening of the labor movement, rising absenteeism—particularly in mining—and the breakdown of work discipline, factors that together exacerbated economic disorder throughout the period.

So, it can be said that the Challenge article preserves central elements of Rosenstein-Rodan’s earlier analyses (1973a, 1973b), such as the characterization of Allende’s economic policy as more populist than genuinely socialist, and the distinction between a consumption revolution and a production revolution—a distinction that serves as the guiding thread of the text. The idea that Chile possessed relatively favorable structural conditions for development is also maintained, which, in turn, made the observed economic collapse all the more costly. It is in this context that the article intensifies the assignment of responsibility to Allende’s leadership, whom Rosenstein-Rodan holds accountable not only for economic policy errors, but also for an inability to impose limits on the most radical sectors of his own support base—an aspect presented more explicitly here than in previous texts.

In turn, compared with the text published in 1975, “Why Allende Failed” does not incorporate a framework aimed at the country’s economic reconstruction, lacking macroeconomic projections, quantitative targets, or estimates of external financing and large-scale international support—elements that would appear systematically only in the text published in 1975.

4.4. The article in the New York Times

In the article published in the New York Times on June 16, 1974, Rosenstein-Rodan (1974b) revisits and consolidates the interpretation he had been developing since at least 1972 regarding the collapse of Allende’s government, integrating arguments previously presented in lectures and articles. This time, however, the narrative is aimed at a broad audience, though this does not imply that the economic diagnosis was abandoned or diluted. The starting point is the characterization of Allende’s death as a tragedy in multiple senses—personal, political, and ideological—including because it was interpreted as evidence of the failure of socialism and its incompatibility with democracy. Rosenstein-Rodan explicitly rejects this interpretation, arguing that the central problem was not socialism per se, but the economic incompetence of the government, which was unable to coordinate income redistribution, demand expansion, and sustained growth in production—something that, he notes almost provocatively, any economics student could have anticipated.

In reconstructing the first months of Allende’s government, Rosenstein-Rodan describes the economic program as a combination of short-term Keynesian measures and long-term Marxist objectives, emphasizing that the initial policy of strong wage redistribution, coupled with the presence of idle capacity, produced positive short-term results—rising industrial output, falling unemployment, and a noticeable improvement in material well-being—which helps to explain, at least in part, the initial support from significant segments of the urban population. Still, the author stresses, with some insistence and echoing points he had made earlier, that this situation was necessarily temporary, since idle capacity was not distributed in a manner compatible with the pattern of demand expansion, there was no equivalent productive margin in agriculture, and monetary expansion at a pace of nearly 10% per month, combined with price controls, would ultimately pressure imports, quickly deplete inherited international reserves, and fuel an inflationary process that would erode even the initial redistributive gains, causing real wages to fall below 1970 levels—an outcome that, in retrospect, seemed almost inevitable.

The New York Times article revisits earlier themes, such as political polarization, middle-class behavior, and electoral participation, portraying the middle class as paralyzed between euphoria and fear, which resulted in bank runs, high consumption, and capital flight. It also emphasizes the breakdown of work discipline, absenteeism, and union activity, highlighting the truckers’ strike as the decisive moment in the government’s collapse. The article develops the discussion on nationalizations, emphasizing that the problem was not state ownership itself but its implementation, particularly in banking, and provides concrete suggestions for compensation mechanisms, linking them to the flight of technical personnel as a key factor in the decline of production.

The New York Times text is rich in concrete examples and episodes, functioning as an interpretive synthesis aimed at a general audience. Unlike the early 1974 CIAP Statement (published in 1975), it does not advance concrete proposals for economic reconstruction, macroeconomic projections, or external financing schemes. The focus remains on diagnosing the failure of Allende’s government and explaining why this failure should not be taken as evidence of the impossibility of socialism or democracy—a distinction reiterated, with slight variations, across all the texts analyzed.

Finally, the article remains closely aligned with the other texts regarding the military coup: Rosenstein-Rodan acknowledges the excesses committed by the generals and expresses concern for human rights, yet maintains that the Chilean junta was neither inspired by classic fascist models nor intended to rule indefinitely—an assessment echoed with similar nuances in the other texts. The New York Times article thus does not represent a substantive shift in position but consolidates an already established interpretation, combining economic diagnosis, historical narrative, and political judgment in a text that, though less technical and at times repetitive, clarifies how, in the author’s view, the collapse of Allende’s government became increasingly difficult to avoid throughout 1972 and 1973.

5. Were there changes in Rosenstein-Rodan’s views and discourse about Chile before and after the coup?

The comparison between Rosenstein-Rodan’s writings on Chile before and after the September 1973 coup reveals a pattern of continuity. It can be argued that the texts produced after the coup deepen and render more explicit positions that were already present in his November 1972 lecture.

On the economic level, continuity is almost absolute. The diagnosis formulated before the coup—that Allende’s government economic policy was doomed to collapse—is reiterated without substantial changes in the later texts. In both periods, Rosenstein-Rodan maintains that the central mistake of the Chilean experience did not lie in its socialist character, but in the populist management of economic policy. The combination of rapid monetary expansion, price controls, swift income redistribution, and neglect of savings formation and productive investment had generated high inflation, falling productivity, depletion of foreign reserves, and, ultimately, contraction in output and employment. In all five texts, the author refers to a critique that he attributes to Fidel Castro, according to which Allende’s government represented a revolution in consumption rather than in production, as would be expected of a Marxist government.

The core skepticism regarding Allende’s mandate persists. In the pre-coup text, Rosenstein-Rodan emphasized the narrow electoral margin obtained in 1970 and argued that the formal victory at the polls did not correspond to a robust social mandate for radical transformations. This reading is revisited in later writings, including the insistence that the majority of the population had voted against Allende. Similarly, the characterization of the opposition as initially paralyzed and disorganized, only later reactivated in response to economic deterioration and illegal expropriations, was already present before 1973 and is reaffirmed afterward.

However, the post-coup texts also reveal a political qualification that was absent from the 1972 lecture. Rosenstein-Rodan continued to present Allende’s collapse as the result of economic mismanagement, but he no longer assumed that the Chilean military would remain apolitical or self-restrained. His post-coup writings therefore combine the acceptance of a strong transitional authority with explicit reservations regarding repression, the banning of parties, institutional imposition, and human rights abuses.

This shift can be measured against the confidence expressed in the November 1972 lecture, in which Rosenstein-Rodan had twice described the Chilean army as “apolitical” and predicted that “the extraordinary combination of preserving political freedom while pursuing a socialist policy will, in my opinion, continue” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 8, 17). Speaking at Boston University on October 9, 1973, less than a month after the coup, he maintained that the economic collapse had made the coup unavoidable, but no longer took the restraint of the military for granted: “The ruin of the economy made the coup practically unavoidable, -it was not a ‘typical Latin American coup’- but there is danger (by no means a certainty however) that the generals may have created a Frankenstein” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 4–5). He then quoted the Manchester Guardian’s assessment that “the military coup in Chile has unleashed forces that the military junta is unable to control” (Manchester Guardian, October 6, 1973, quoted in Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 5).

Since the exact wording reveals the limits of his acquiescence, the concerns summarized in Section 4.1 are worth quoting. Emergency measures during what threatened to become a civil war were acceptable, “but to program an ideological crusade, ‘to extirpate Marxism’, and to introduce methods of inquisition, is a different matter” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 5). In the same passage: “when shooting starts, sadistic instincts emerge, but to continue with book burning, forced hair cutting and sheer brutality is a different matter. There is reason for legitimate concern about the state of human rights in Chile” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 5).

The same applies to the institutional criticisms: the new constitution should “be voted by a specially convoked Constituent Assembly, not proclaimed by a lawyer’s committee appointed by the Junta,” and the banning of the parties of the Unidad Popular, “representing more than 1/3 of the population,” “is not going to succeed and will prove counterproductive” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 6). What matters for the comparison pursued here is that this criticism was not confined to a single occasion: it reappears in nearly identical terms in the Challenge article published several months later, down to the remark that “Chile is not Brazil; its political consciousness is more deeply rooted” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 13; almost identical in 1973b, 6). The Challenge version extends the criticism to the suspension of political activity in general: “The banning of all other political activity—if sustained—points the wrong way and is a bad omen” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 13). These passages indicate that his acceptance of the economic diagnosis of Allende’s failure did not amount to unqualified support for the military regime.

The position underlying these reservations is stated most clearly in the closing lines of both the October 1973 talk and the Challenge article: “In the intermediate period, it may be that political activity must be suppressed; but this should be only a transition period. In the long run, in a good society every man has the right to hold a wrong opinion. In every society it is always an elite minority that governs; but in a good society it governs by persuasion rather than by coercion” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 13; for a nearly identical formulation, see Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 6). The comparison between the Chilean generals and De Gaulle, already sketched in the October 1973 talk (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 6), should be read in this light. In Challenge, as in the New York Times, it appears in a sentence that opens with an acknowledgment of the violence of the regime: “Despite the excesses of the Chilean generals—and there is reason to fear these days for the state of human rights in Chile—I still suspect that their concept of the ideal leader is not Mussolini or Franco but de Gaulle” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 13; the same passage appears in Rosenstein-Rodan 1974b). The cautious wording—“I still suspect,” like the earlier “danger (by no means a certainty however)”—expresses an expectation about the trajectory of the junta rather than a settled judgment about its nature. Rosenstein-Rodan also applied to the generals the metaphor he had used to explain Allende’s failure, according to which being a revolutionary is like being in love, and people in love do not learn from other people’s mistakes: “This was eminently true of Allende and may now be true of the junta generals” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 12; see also 1973b, 4; 1974b).

These passages support the characterization of his concerns as recurrent but uneven. The concern with the excesses of repression and with human rights appears in the three texts addressed to academic and general audiences (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 1974a, 1974b), while the more specific criticisms of the party bans and of the institutional reorganization conducted by the Junta appear in the October 1973 talk and in the Challenge article. Their recurrence, often in nearly the same words, suggests that they were a stable component of his public position rather than isolated concessions. Yet, as shown in Section 4.2, explicit references to repression, human rights, and the banning of parties are absent from the Statement delivered before the CIAP, in which Rosenstein-Rodan acted as an advocate of a large-scale international financing effort for Chilean reconstruction (Rosenstein-Rodan 1975), even though the closing appeal to national reconciliation retains a trace of the same concern.

His restraint in that forum, however, was perhaps not only a matter of audience. The appeal to a strong government was not necessarily alien to the vocabulary of the development economics he had helped to found: a strategy centered on massive and coordinated investment can, depending on the context, be more easily implemented under a strong authority. It was in these terms that Rosenstein-Rodan assessed post-coup Chile before the CIAP: “Only a strong government can successfully apply shock tactics and harmonize the effects afterwards” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1975, 220). This may help to explain why the ideas of a pioneer of state-led development could find points of compatibility with the transitional stability promised by an authoritarian regime—without this implying a conversion to the free-market orthodoxy.16

However, despite his reservations about the post-coup Chilean administration—particularly regarding threats to human rights—and the fact that his criticisms were limited to Allende’s administration and not socialism itself, Rosenstein-Rodan’s positions were apparently interpreted as unconditional support for the military junta. Moreover, the author was perceived as downplaying the brutalities committed by the military and the active involvement of the United States government (mediated by the CIA in promoting the truckers’ strike), given that he did not conceal his position in the months following the coup.17

According to Alacevich (2021), in an interview published on September 24, 1974, in a student newspaper circulating on the Boston University campus, Rosenstein-Rodan stated that he had visited Chile five times after the military coup. These trips certainly reinforced his controversial interpretation of the event, which he described as a necessary upheaval within the country’s transition toward a calmer and more sensible climate. This narrative closely mirrored the official account promoted by Pinochet’s inner circle (Alacevich 2021).

Faced with what was perceived as an overly lenient reading, Rosenstein-Rodan was harshly criticized in academic and journalistic circles. At a conference he organized at CLADS in October 1974, protests by students outraged at his presence forced the event staff to lock the doors of the room where he was located. Professional colleagues distanced themselves, and friends from his close circle simply began to ignore him (Alacevich 2021).

6. Concluding remarks

Faced with the deepening economic crisis in Chile in the early 1970s, Rosenstein-Rodan believed that it was inevitable for Allende to be replaced by a leader who would alter the country’s economic direction. Whether due to the ideology underpinning his policies or the manner in which the economic plan was designed and executed, he generally regarded that government as detrimental to social harmony and national prosperity.

Decades of research and study on Latin American development made Rosenstein-Rodan an expert in advising governments and international aid institutions. Consistent with the concepts of the big push and balanced growth, the strategy he advocated for Chile relied on large government-directed investments.

Although he agreed with the temporary suspension of political freedoms to reorganize economic and social forces in the short term, Rosenstein-Rodan argued that they should be restored as soon as possible (Rosenstein-Rodan 1974a, 8). Furthermore, he did not deem socialism as the problem per se. He argued that it was the poor implementation of a socialist policy, rather than its inherent nature, that led Chile to collapse.

It is true that his approach to the Chilean crisis was highly controversial, as his interventions addressed issues that were particularly sensitive in a society still marked by institutional rupture and the violence of the new regime. However, an examination of his analyses of the Chilean situation immediately before and after the coup points to a more ambivalent and context-dependent position. These texts combine a sustained economic critique of the Allende administration with recurrent—if uneven—expressions of concern regarding authoritarian repression and human rights violations.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank André Roncaglia de Carvalho, Carlos Eduardo Suprinyak, Marco Cavalieri, Marcos Taroco Resende, Nicolás Dvoskin, and two anonymous referees. The usual caveats apply. This study was financed in part by the Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior – Brasil (CAPES) – Finance Code 001, and in part by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), Brazil.

Competing Interests

The authors have no competing interests to declare.

Notes

  1. Chile “has been the laboratory for a controversial experiment in free-market economic policies since the early 1970s. That experiment involved the brutal dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet and Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago, the so-called Chicago Boys who were influenced by Milton Friedman” (Irwin 2024, 768). [^]
  2. In Edwards’s (2023, 109) personal account of some of his conversations with Friedman, “[e]very time I approached the subject of Pinochet, the shock treatment, or any other aspect of the Chilean economy, I noticed some reluctance on Friedman’s behalf. It was not that he avoided the issues, but he hesitated— something that was quite unusual for him. He repeated the points that he had made many times in columns, interviews, speeches, and in his memoir. Yes, he had met with Pinochet, as he had met with many other heads of state and government leaders, including Zhao Ziyang, the secretary- general of the Communist Party of China. But meeting with a politician was not the same as being an adviser. He had not advised Pinochet or Zhao, and that was the main point. He also told me that his personal relationship with the Chicago Boys was minimal. Before traveling to Santiago in 1975, he didn’t even know their names, with one notable exception— that of Rolf Lüders. With time, he said, he established a personal and friendly relationship with Sergio de Castro and Ernesto Fontaine.” The criticisms directed at Friedman for his alleged support for Pinochet and the Chicago Boys, including from other Nobel Prize winners and through a protest at the Nobel ceremony in 1976, led to the fact that “deep inside, Friedman was bothered by the Chilean episode” (Edwards 2023, 108). [^]
  3. The biographical information on Rosenstein-Rodan was drawn from Alacevich (2021). [^]
  4. Alberto Bachelet was the father of Michelle Bachelet, who served as president of Chile from 2006 to 2010 and from 2014 to 2018. [^]
  5. With some irony, he affirms that “It created a panic first of all in Santiago rather than in the United States. I don’t know whether the ‘low profile’ was due to a low hormonic count or to increased political intelligence” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 1). [^]
  6. On more than one occasion in 1970, Ambassador Korry indicated that Rosenstein-Rodan was pressing Frei to act against Allende’s confirmation, relaying suggestions that originated with Korry himself. See U.S. Department of State 2014, docs. 132, 142. [^]
  7. “A political science problem emerges, however. What is the meaning of political freedom when all sources of economic power are concentrated in one hand. Is it not hollow?” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973a, 19). [^]
  8. Created in 1961 under the administration of John F. Kennedy, the Alliance for Progress aimed to finance development in Latin America. The program focused on areas such as literacy, agrarian reform, income redistribution, monetary stability, and industrialization. Despite these stated objectives, it was clear that the initiative also sought to contain the spread of communism in the region, which had been profoundly shaken just two years earlier by the Cuban Revolution (Grunwald 1964). [^]
  9. “Any undergraduate economics student would have known that this policy could not work out. Russia is also a Socialist society but it does not increase its money supply by 10% every month, has no inflation of 300% and did not establish an income redistribution which could not possibly be sustained” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 2). [^]
  10. “Allende was not ready to oppose the hotheads on the left. As a sentimental man he said ‘I am not going to move against my own party. I am not going to be a Ramsey McDonald’. This is nice and romantic, but if one feels that way one should sublimate it and write a poem, not be President of a Republic.” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 3). [^]
  11. Even though he seems to adopt a somewhat ironic tone: “Even very democratically since he only had 36.3% of the votes” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 3, n. 1). [^]
  12. “63.7% of the Chileans voted without enthusiasm for the minor evil: they voted--as it were--for ‘flu in order to avoid dysentery’. More than half of those who voted for Allende, on the other hand, (i.e. at least 20% of the population) did so in a revolutionary euphoria. No euphoria was visible on the side of the opposition during the first year of Allende’s government” (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1973b, 4). [^]
  13. “To be a revolutionary is like being in love. The characteristic of people in love is that they do not believe anybody else in their lifetime was also in love. So they do not learn from other people’s mistakes and repeat all the same errors. It was eminently true of Allende and it may now be true of the junta generals. The middle class is like middle age. When they fall in love it is more dangerous and less attractive” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1973b, 4). [^]
  14. The analogy becomes clearer if we bear in mind that, a little later on, Rosenstein-Rodan argues that one of the virtues Chile possessed at the time—and one that would contribute to what he saw as the country’s reconstruction—was the possibility of obtaining external assistance, drawing a parallel with what he called a “Chilean Jean Monnet.” In this sense, he appears to be emphasizing Chile’s strong international standing and, possibly, the recovery of its credibility abroad following the inauguration of the new government. As is well known, Jean Monnet was a French politician and diplomat who, among other things, served as a French representative to Britain and the United States during the Second World War, and later became a leading advocate of deeper European integration in the postwar period. [^]
  15. “Apart from the economic reconstruction, Chile certainly needs moral reconstruction to heal the exacerbation and cleavages which have torn the Nation. For this, long vision and magnanimity are needed by three participants: the government, the entrepreneurs and the workers. […] If magnanimity were forthcoming, social harmony the most important but also the most difficult goal— might be reestablished and with it the “Chile Lindo” which we all loved and love still.” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1975, 221). [^]
  16. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point. [^]
  17. Alacevich (2021), however, points out that his archival research found that Rosenstein-Rodan used his influence to advocate for the release of certain political prisoners in Chile, succeeding in at least one case. [^]

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